The American economy is developing better and better. Oddly enough, this also applies to Donald Trump's polls. Historically, it is difficult to find a period in which a sitting president, without a major scandal or failed war, has suffered such abysmal public approval in the face of widespread prosperity.
But for all the questions this predicament raises, at least one persistent question should be addressed: whether the source of Donald Trump's appeal is the impoverishment of the working class.
The idea that Trumpism arose from the shuttered factories of the Rust Belt, or perhaps from the stagnant job market following the Great Recession, first took hold about eight years ago. Reporter Jeff Guo found links between areas that supported Trump in the Republican primaries and “deaths of despair.” Left-wing commentator Thomas Frank wrote: “Could it be that all this trade stuff is a key to understanding the Trump phenomenon?”…We cannot admit that we liberals bear some of the blame for its emergence, for the frustration of millions Working class, in their dilapidated cities and their downward spiraling lives.”
When Trump surprisingly defeated Hillary Clinton, leftists used the event to announce their rejection of the entire Democratic Party program. “Working- and middle-class whites rejected the economic neglect of neoliberal policies and the self-righteous arrogance of elites out of anger and fear,” wrote Cornel West. “Trump’s election was made possible by the neoliberal policies of the Clintons and Obamas, which ignored the plight of our most vulnerable citizens.”
But it wasn't just the left that represented this business-centered understanding of the Trump phenomenon. The mainstream also believed that Trump's supporters had been left behind by the economy. The New York Times' Election Night report on Trump's 2016 victory described his supporters as “a largely overlooked coalition of mostly white, blue-collar and working-class voters who felt the promise of the United States to them amid decades of globalization.” “and multiculturalism.”
Analysts who have closely examined the Trump vote cast doubt on that premise. Social, not economic, issues were the primary motivation for the voter switch from Barack Obama in 2012 to Donald Trump in 2016.
But the business-centered interpretation never died. One reason is that it has been difficult to cleanly separate the effects of culture from the effects of economics. Educational polarization is the major trend in politics, not only in the United States but throughout the developed world. And because education and income are linked, it is not always easy to tell which factor is driving the trend and which is simply being carried along. If Trump loses votes in a wealthy, college-educated city and wins votes in a working-class city, the cause of the shift is not obvious.
A second reason the economic narrative of Trumpism has endured is that it flatters his supporters. Describing a phenomenon as a populist revolt against economic elites is not just a description but a moral indictment that allows Democratic Party critics to smear it as a tool of the elite.
“We are being lectured endlessly by progressive elites in politics and the media about how great the Biden economy is,” claims conservative expert Batya Ungar-Sargon. “It's actually great – if, like the elites who lecture you, you own a house and have a stock portfolio. But for most Americans who live paycheck to paycheck, it’s terrible.”
American Compass, a right-wing populist think tank, recently published an analysis purporting to show that the “upper class” has become overwhelmingly Democratic. The report was enthusiastically received by the party's left-wing critics, such as Samuel Moyn:
Is it bad? Because it looks bad. pic.twitter.com/NvPLFn3tgp
– Samuel Moyn 🔭 (@samuelmoyn) January 25, 2024
But American Compass's definition of “class” wasn't quite what you wanted. It linked educational status with income. And the survey grouped respondents who didn't report their income based solely on their education status, so those who had advanced degrees but didn't report their wages were defined as “upper class.” This definition includes, for example, teachers—most of whom have advanced degrees—and many other workers whom we would counterintuitively describe as “upper class.”
And most frustratingly, the economic trends during Trump's term and in the years that followed also made it difficult to refute the economic interpretation. Economic trends did not change when Trump took office, but the ongoing economic recovery pushed the unemployment rate to levels that eventually began to drive up workers' wages. The boom came to a halt in 2020, but its effects were immediately replaced by generous economic aid.
Many Democrats adopted versions of that belief, hoping that Biden would undermine elements of Trump's economic appeal by both adopting his nationalist trade strategy and restoring the high-pressure labor market of his first three years. Democratic Senator Chris Murphy of Connecticut wrote a 2022 Atlantic column arguing that neoliberal economic policies had alienated the working class from Democrats, but Bidenomics would win them back:
In largely rural parts of the country, Americans who feel abandoned by neoliberal economic policies are seeking to regain control of their economic destiny.
Fortunately, President Biden's successes in his first two years provide Democrats with an opportunity to sell a new, successful message of actionable economic nationalism – the antidote to the failures of neoliberalism. Biden has already passed three major pieces of legislation that show how economic nationalism works in practice. First, the bipartisan infrastructure bill envisioned rebuilding America's roads, rails, and power lines, which would bring lost jobs back to America. Second, the CHIPS Act has rebooted America's microchip industry, as evidenced by the recent announcement of a $20 billion, 3,000-job microchip factory in Ohio. Finally, the Inflation Reduction Act boosted the domestic renewable energy industry; By one estimate, the law will create 9 million new jobs over the next decade.
The political element of the plan was undeniable — Biden had kept Trump's tariffs in place while building large subsidies for manufacturing in lagging cities. His “blue collar plan” would win back those workers who had been abandoned by neoliberalism.
The plan was thwarted, at least initially, by the rise in inflation following the pandemic. Rising worker wages failed to keep pace with rising prices in 2021 and 2022. No wonder workers struggling with high costs longed for Trump to return. Trump-era prosperity had given way to Biden-era inflation. So a year ago, it was still possible to look at Trump's support base and see the economy as the primary cause.
But these economic conditions no longer apply. Inflation has finally returned to normal and the job market remains red-hot. Wages were above price levels last year.
Arindrajit Dube, an economics professor at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, recently detailed how the recovery has led to real wage growth. After inflation and the clawback of COVID-era fiscal support squeezed the wallet in the first two years of Biden's term, inflation-adjusted wages are now growing faster than the pre-pandemic trend:
Graphics: Project Syndicate
And contrary to the claim that only the elite benefited, Dube confirms that exactly the opposite happened. The lowest-income households have gained the most, while the wealthiest households have lost purchasing power:
Graphics: Project Syndicate
Not only has this not diminished Trump's reputation, it has also increased it. Last year, at a time when the economy was recovering, the former president went from tied with Biden to two points ahead. It is understandable that public opinion lags behind economic conditions. But reporting on the economy has become significantly positive in recent months, and sentiment towards the economy has also turned downward. Nevertheless, Biden's poll numbers continue to deteriorate.
There is enough time for conditions to take effect and lift Biden's approval rating. But at this point, a return to election conditions around 2020 (Biden wins by 4.5 percent) would be a best-case scenario.
All of this means that creating broadly shared prosperity for the working class has so far done nothing to reduce the appeal of Trumpism. His appeal does not arise from desperation or desperation. Whatever alchemy created the Trump cult, money alone will not drive it away.
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