The massive Russian missile strikes are having no impact on the Ukraine frontline

Russian forces conducted large-scale missile strike all over Ukraine to strike Ukraine for the second time in a row on the 11th of October. According to the Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces fired close to 30 Kh-101 and Kh-55 cruise missiles from Tu-95 as well as Tu-160 strategic bombers. They also damaged critical infrastructure in Lviv, Vinnytsia, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, and Zaporizhia oblasts. 1 Ukrainian air defense has reportedly defeated 21 cruise missiles as well as 11 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). [2] Social media videos show the aftermath of the strikes across Ukraine. [33 Russian forces also continued to launch attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure with Iranian-made Shahed-136 drones. [4] According to the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian air defenses destroyed eight Shahed-136 drones within Mykolaiv Oblast on the night between October 10 and 11. [5]

Army General Sergey Surovikin’s previous experience as commander of Russian Armed Forces in Syria likely does not explain the massive explosion of missiles across Ukraine during the past few days and does not indicate a change in the trajectory of Russian capabilities or strategies in Ukraine. The Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) representative, Andriy Yusov, linked the recent strikes to Surovikin’s appointment as theatre commander and stated on October 11 on the 11th of October that “throwing rockets at civilian infrastructure objects” is in keeping with Surovikin’s tactics in Syria. [6] However, Surovikin has been serving as a commander in Ukraine (as the commander of the Russian Aerospace Forces and then the Southern Grouping of Russian troops) since the beginning of the war, and so have many senior Russian commandos also connected to Russian activities in Syria. 7. Major General of the Army Aleksandr Dvornikov, who was appointed in April for the post that Surovikin currently holds, also had the command of Russian soldiers in Syria between 2015-2016 and became notorious for his brutally and deliberately attacking civilians. 8 Colonel General Aleksandr Chayko, the former commander of the Eastern Military District who took active part in beginning stages of the war in Ukraine was also the Chief of Staff for Russian military forces operating in Syria until the end of 2015 and the year 2016. [9] As ISW stated in April that all Russian military district, aerospace, and airborne commanders had at least one mission in Syria as either chief of staff or the commander of Russian forces. Russian forces attacked civilian infrastructure such as breadlines and hospitals throughout the duration of Russia’s active involvement in that war. 10. Disregard of international law and an enthusiasm to savagely attack civilians was the norm for Russian troops in Syria prior to, during and following the time of Surovikin’s presidency. It is now an integral part of Russian method of warfare.

Surovikin’s appointment will not cause a greater “Syrianization” of Russian operations in Ukraine since the battlespace in Ukraine is very distinct from the battlefields in Syria, and direct comparisons with the Surovikin’s Syrian “playbook” obfuscate the reality that Russia has its own unique issues in Ukraine. Russia is unable to continue to “Syrianize” the war largely because of its failure to attain air supremacy, which precludes its ability to conduct the type of massive air-bombing operations across Ukraine that it was able to, and did have conducted in Syria. ISW has previously concluded the fact that Russian military operations be significantly different if conducted in contested airspace or a more demanding air defense environment, such as is the scenario in Ukraine. The conclusion is that it is very unlikely that Surovikin’s position as commander of the theatre will trigger a fundamental change of Russian activities in the air or missile field of Ukraine as the country’s Western supporters continue to supply Kyiv in the form of air defenses required to prevent Russia in gaining aerial supremacy.

Russian military officials may instead have coordinated the selection of Surovikin as well as the October 10 cruise missile strikes against Ukrainian crucial infrastructure to help improve the image that is held by that of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). Whoever was appointed as director of the theater would have been responsible for the cruise missile strikes, which Ukrainian intelligence reports claimed had been planned from the beginning of October (and which Surovikin certainly didn’t plan, prepare for, and conduct on the day of his appointment). [12] Russian milbloggers have recently lauded the huge strike on October 10 as well as Surovikin’s appointment , and have interpreted the two as positive events to Russian operations in Ukraine. This narrative may be aligned with the ongoing Russian information operations in order to repair the image for Central Military District Command Colonel General Aleksandr Lapin following Russian failures regarding Lyman as part of a larger strategy to improve the public’s perception regarding his position within the Russian militarists. The Russian MoD has clearly put a lot of effort in repairing its public image, and the informational effects of the October 10 missile strikes and the appointment of Surovikin, a hero in the extreme nationalist Russian infosphere, could be to cater to the most vocal voices within the space.

Russian Federation is likely extracting ammunition and other items from Belarusian storage bases, an activity that is incompatible with setting conditions for a major-scale Russian or Belarusian military strike towards Ukraine in Belarus. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on October 11 that a train loaded with more than 492 tons of ammunition from Belarusian 43rd Missile and Ammunition Storage Arsenal in Gomel arrived at the Kirovskaya Railway Station in Crimea on an unspecified recent past date. [13] The GUR reported that Belarusian officials plan to send an additional 13 trains with weapons, equipment, ammunition, and other unspecified materiel from five different Belarusian bases to the Kamenska (Kamensk-Shakhtinsky) and Marchevo (Taganrog) railway stations in Rostov Oblast on an unspecified future date. Open-source social media footage supports this story. Geolocated footage shows that at the very least, two Belarusian trains transporting Belarusian T-72 tanks as well as Ural military trucks to Minsk and Tor-M2 surface-to-air missile launchers in Orsha (Vitebsk Oblast) on the 11th of October. 14 Belarusian equipment movements into Russia indicate it is likely that Russian and Belarusian forces likely are not establishing assembly areas in Belarus. Belarusian equipment and supply movements to Crimea as well as Rostov Oblast show that Russian forces are not as confident regarding their security Russian ground lines of communication traversing the western and northern Luhansk Oblast, given the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive in the region. Ukraine’s General Staff reiterated that it supervises Belarus and hasn’t observed signs of the formation of offensive groups in Belarus on October 11. [15] Russian and or Belarusian forces are unlikely to strike Ukraine from Belarus according to what ISW previously analyzed. [16]

Belarus is a co-belligerent of Russia’s conflict with Ukraine however. Belarus materially supports Russian military operations in Ukraine and provides Russian forces with havens from which to attack Ukraine using precise munition. Russian forces attacked Kyiv using Shahed-136 drones that were which were launched from Belarusian territory on October 10. [17 The GUR additionally reported that Russia deployed 32 Shahed-136 drones to Belarus on October 10, in addition to stating that Russia will send eight drones to Belarus by October 14. [18]

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces launched massive missile strikes across Ukraine on the 2nd day in a row.
• General Sergey Surovikin’s previous experience as the commander of Russian Armed Forces in Syria is not likely to be related to the massive wave of missile strikes across Ukraine over the past few days. It also doesn’t signal a change in the direction of Russian capabilities or strategy within Ukraine.
• HTML0 The Russian Federation is likely extracting ammunition and other materials from Belarusian storage facilities that are incompatible with the notion of Russian forces are setting conditions for a ground attack towards Ukraine in Belarus.
• Russian sources stated that Ukrainian forces continued to conduct counteroffensives to the east of the Oskil River and in the direction of Kreminna-Svatove.
• Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian troops continued ground attacks in the western and northern regions of Kherson Oblast.
• Ukrainian forces continue to conduct an interdiction operation that targets Russian military, technical, and logistics assets as well as concentration zones located in Kherson Oblast.
• Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks within the Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian reporting of the explosions that occurred within Dzhankoy, Crimea, indicated panic over losing further logistical capabilities in Crimea in the wake of an explosion at the Kerch Strait Bridge explosion.
• Russian federal subject are announcing new extensions and stages of mobilisation within select regions, which could indicate that they haven’t met their mobilization requirements.
• Russian and occupation administration officials continue to operate filtration within Russian-occupied territory.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Southern and Eastern Ukraine
• Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and two supporting efforts);
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Oskil River-Kreminna Line)

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued to conduct offensive operations east of the Oskil River in the direction of Kreminna and Svatove on October 11. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian forces near Krokhmalne in Kharkiv Oblast (20km northwest of Svatove) and Stel’makhivka in Luhansk Oblast (15km northwest of Svatove).[19] The Russian MoD also claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attempted to cross the Zherebets River southwest of Svatove in the direction of Raihorodka and Novovodiane, Luhansk Oblast, on October 11.[20] [21] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are regrouping and restoring combat capabilities near Kupyansk to prepare for assaults near the Pershotravneve-Kyslivka line.[22] The milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces are concentrating personnel and equipment in the Lyman-Svatove direction to launch an offensive on Svatove and Kreminna with a strike group of up to 40,000 personnel.[23]  ISW makes no effort to forecast Ukrainian operations or to evaluate the likelihood of Russian forecasts about them.

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces conducted a local counterattack and recaptured territories west of Kreminna while continuing to establish defensive positions in the Kreminna-Svatove area on October 11. Russian milbloggers claimed on October 11 that Russian forces conducted counteroffensive operations east of Lyman and recaptured Terny, Torske, Novosadove, Makiivka, and Nevske, although ISW cannot independently verify any of these claims.[24] Russian sources posted videos on October 11 purporting to show Russian forces constructing trenches with BTM-3 entrenching machines along the Svatove-Kreminna line, with one source dubbing the effort a Russian-made “Maginot” line (referring to the massive belt of French fortifications built between the two world wars that the Germans simply drove around).[25] Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai also reported that Russian forces are continuing to mine territory in Luhansk Oblast to slow Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.[26] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted routine indirect fire along the Oskil River-Kreminna line on October 11.[27]

Southern Ukraine: (Kherson Oblast)

Russian sources continued to claim that Ukrainian troops conducted ground attacks in northern and western Kherson Oblast on October 11. The Russian MoD claimed that two Ukrainian battalion tactical groups (BTGs) conducted offensive operations in the direction of Borozenske and Piatykhatky—both along the current Davydiv Brid-Dudchany frontline in northern Kherson Oblast and about 35km from the critical Russian-controlled town of Beryslav.[28] A Russian milblogger similarly indicated that Ukrainian troops are preparing to advance south of the Davydiv Brid-Dudchany line and conducting artillery preparations for subsequent attacks on Russian positions in the direction of Beryslav.[29] Russian milbloggers additionally indicated that Ukrainian troops are attempting to reinforce positions in the Davydiv Brid area (western Kherson Oblast near the Mykolaiv Oblast border and along the Inhulets River) to prepare for advances to the southeast.[30] Several Russian sources reported that Ukrainian troops attempted to attack toward Bruskynske (6km south of Davyvid Brid), Ishchenka (8km southeast of Davydiv Brid), and Sadok (12km southeast of Davydiv Brid).[31] ISW offers no evaluation of these Russian claims regarding likely future Ukrainian operations or force groupings.

Ukrainian military officials largely maintained their operational silence regarding Ukrainian ground attacks in Kherson Oblast but reiterated that Ukrainian forces are continuing an interdiction campaign to target Russian military, technical, and logistics assets and concentration areas.[32] Geolocated social media footage posted October 11 shows the aftermath of October 10 Ukrainian strikes on a medical college dormitory in Beryslav that Russian forces were reportedly using as quarters.[33] Imagery posted on October 11 additionally shows damage to the Antonivsky Bridge in Kherson City following a Ukrainian HIMARS strike.[34] Geolocated footage shows a Ukrainian RAM II loitering munition striking a Russian Osa air defense system near Kyselivka, 17km northwest of Kherson City.[35]

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